Monday, 9 December 2019

Analysis of Ryuk Ransomware

[Authors: Viktoria Taran, Alexander Adamov]

The Ryuk ransomware seen for the first time in August 2018 has been successfully used in targeted attacks encrypting data and asking for a ransom payment which differs from 10 BC to 50 BC. The recent attack was executed against DCH hospitals in Alabama on October 1st, 2019. As a result, DCH paid the ransom to recover the data stored on their servers. In this report, we analyze one of the recent versions of Ryuk ransomware discovering the installation process, networking details, and encryption model.

Sunday, 29 September 2019

GermanWiper: One More Wiper Pretending to Be Ransomware

[Authors: Viktoria Taran, Alexander Adamov]

GermanWiper was first seen on the BleepingComputer forum on July 30, 2019. After analysis, it turned out that the malware is rather a wiper than ransomware. Interestingly, GermanWiper managed to raise $9,000 almost reaching the result of $10,500 (4.13528947 BTC) earned by another wiper called NotPetya in June 2017. Let us take a close look at the ransomware to find out the installation process, communication details, and wiping details.

Tuesday, 27 August 2019

Anti-Cryptojacking Test - July 2019

Cryptojacking or malicious cryptomining is a new type of threat that can be described as the unsolicited use of a user’s computing device to mine cryptocurrency. There are two types of cryptojacking attack: general-purpose and targeted.

Saturday, 23 March 2019

Analysis of LockerGoga Ransomware

Картинки по запросу Norsk Hydro
Norsk Hydro back in 1905. 

This week BleepingComputer reported that LockerGoga ransomware was allegedly responsible for disrupting the Norsk Hydro's IT control system and forced the Norwegian industrial giant to switch to the manual operation mode. Later, according to Motherboard, this ransomware disrupted IT services of the two more US chemical companies Hexion and Momentive. Thus, it seems that the attackers behind LockerGoga target critical infrastructure and those mentioned above are not the only victims of the ransomware up to the moment. Further, we provide a detailed analysis of the ransomware encryption process.

Tuesday, 31 July 2018

VB2018: Artificial intelligence to assist with ransomware cryptanalysis

It's always very exciting for me to be able to attend and, moreover, speak at the Virus Bulletin Conference. Because, it is the oldest and the most respectful antivirus conference that has been running since 1991 where cybersecurity experts from academia and industry gather to share their ideas, research, and forecasts. You can meet the researches who helped to boost the antivirus industry decades ago and are now the core of the antivirus community.

This year in Montreal, we'll present an academic research conducted by my master student Kateryna Vitiuk under my supervision and devoted to Cryptanalysis of ransomware with the help of Artificial Intelligence.

When analyzing ransomware, we often see the hardcoded implementation of the AES, RC4, Salsa20 algorithms, for example in TeslaCrypt, Locky, GlobeImposter, MoneroPay ransomware. The ciphers' code can be poorly detected in the ransomware's memory dumps using the signature-based approach using Krypto ANALyzer (KANAL) for PEiD tool and publicly available Yara rules. Therefore, we assumed that it is possible to use the smart pattern matching method to find the known crypto primitives in the ransomware's disassembled code.

See also:

Wednesday, 21 March 2018

Corporate Backup Solutions Self-Defense Test - March 2018

In the light of the growing number of ransomware attacks in which cryptolockers terminate database processes to unlock the database files for encryption (Cerber, GlobeImposter, Rapid, Serpent) and can encrypt local and network backups to demand a ransom (Rapid, Spora), we decided to test self-defense capabilities of the top backup solutions used in business environments available for trial.

The test aims at testing the sustainability of product’s processes and services against typical attacks to security software described below, as well as self-protection of local backup and product’s files. Ransomware can encrypt local backup files and configuration files that belong to a backup program thereby disabling the recovery of the files. Moreover, once access to agent’s or server’s processes is gained, an attacker can delete backup copies of the files not only locally, but also in the cloud on behalf of a backup solution.

See the full report by the link.

Sunday, 4 February 2018